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Abstract
Research has shown that widely used deep neu-
ral networks are vulnerable to carefully crafted
adversarial perturbations. Moreover, these ad-
versarial perturbations often transfer across mod-
els. We hypothesize that adversarial weakness
is composed of three sources of bias: architec-
ture, dataset, and random initialization. We show
that one can decompose adversarial examples
into an architecture-dependent component, data-
dependent component, and noise-dependent com-
ponent and that these components behave intu-
itively. For example, noise-dependent compo-
nents transfer poorly to all other models, while
architecture-dependent components transfer bet-
ter to retrained models with the same architec-
ture. In addition, we demonstrate that these com-
ponents can be recombined to improve transfer-
ability without sacrificing efficacy on the original
model.
1. Introduction
Due to the recent successes of neural networks on a wide
variety of tasks, they are now being widely applied in the
real-world. However, despite their major successes, recent
works have shown that in the presence of adversarially per-
turbed input, they fail catastrophically (Szegedy et al., 2013;
Goodfellow et al., 2014). Moreover, Szegedy et al. (2013);
Goodfellow et al. (2014) showed that inputs adversarially
generated for one model often cause other models to mis-
classify images as well, a phenomenon commonly called
transferability.
Our understanding of the causes of transferability is fairly
limited. Trame`r et al. (2017) analyzes local similarity of de-
cision boundaries to define a local decision boundary metric
that determines how transferable adversarial examples be-
*Equal contribution 1Department of Computer Science, Cornell
University, Ithaca, NY, USA 2Facebook AI, New York, New York,
USA. Correspondence to: Horace He <hh498@cornell.edu>.
Proceedings of the 35 th International Conference on Machine
Learning, Stockholm, Sweden, PMLR 80, 2018. Copyright 2018
by the author(s).
tween two models are likely to be. However, many questions
are still open. The recent work Wu et al. (2018) hypothe-
sized that adversarial perturbations could be decomposed
into initialization-specific and data-dependent components.
It is also hypothesized that the data-dependent component
is primarily what contributes to transfer. However, Wu et al.
(2018) provides neither theoretical nor empirical evidence
to justify this hypothesis.
Our work aims to examine this hypothesis in greater detail.
We first augment the previous hypothesis to provide de-
composition into three parts: architecture-dependent, data-
dependent, and noise-dependent components. Given this
framework, our contributions are as follows:
• We propose a method for decomposing adversarial
perturbations into noise-dependent and noise-reduced
components.
• We also present a method to further decompose the
noise-reduced component into architecture-dependent
and data-dependent components.
• Extensive experiments are conducted on CIFAR-10
(Krizhevsky, 2009) using various architectures to show
the above two decompositions have the desired proper-
ties. Results from an ablation study are given to show
the significance of the nontrivial choices made in our
methodology.
2. Motivation and Approach
Motivated by the reviewers’ comments on Wu et al. (2018),
we seek to provide further evidence that an adversarial
example can be decomposed into model-dependent and
data-dependent portions. First, we augment our hypoth-
esis to claim that an adversarial perturbation can be de-
composed into architecture-dependent, data-dependent, and
noise-dependent components. We note that it is clear that
these are the only things that could contribute in some way
to the adversarial example. An intuition behind why noise-
dependent components exist and would not transfer despite
working on the original dataset is shown in Figure 2.
Not drawn explicitly in the figure is the architecture-
dependent component. As neural networks induce biases in
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Figure 1. Noise Vector Decomposition. ∆xnoise, ∆xdata,
∆xarch are as defined in Section 2.1. Note the orthogonality
of ∆xnoise and ∆xarch + ∆xdata; though this is only an
assumption, it is justified to be reasonable experimentally in
the ablation study of Section 3.3.
Figure 2. Varying Decision Boundaries. In the above figure,
∆x is the adversarial perturbation, and ∆xnoise, ∆xnr are as
defined in Section 2.1.
the decision boundary, and specific network architectures
induce specific biases, we would expect that an adversarial
example could exploit these biases across all models with
the same architecture.
2.1. Notation
We denote A = {A0,A1, . . . ,Ak} to be the set of model
architectures. LetMi = {Miα} to be a set of fully trained
models of architecture Ai initialized with random noise.
The superscript will be omitted when architecture is clear.
We define an attack A(x, y,Mij ,L,∆x0) = ∆x, where
x is an image, y its corresponding label, Mij is a neural
network model as defined above, L is a loss function, ∆x0
the initial perturbation of x, and ∆x a perturbation of x such
that L(Mij(x+ ∆x), y) is maximal.
For fixed architecture Ai, model Mij , and attack A, we
denote ∆xnoise,∆xarch,∆xdata to be the three com-
ponents of ∆x introduced in previous sections. Let
∆xnoise reduced = ∆xarch+ ∆xdata; we will use the short
hand ∆xnr.
Let Px1(x2) denotes the projection of vector x2 onto vector
x1. Let x̂ = x||x|| be the unit vector with same direction as
x.
2.2. ∆xnoise and ∆xnr Decomposition
Description: We fix our architecture A0 and have
{M1, . . . ,Mn} as our set of trained models. Set L to
be the cross-entropy loss and let ∆x = A(x, y,M1,L,0)
be the generated adversarial perturbation forM1.
Proposition: ∆x can be decomposed into ∆xnoise+∆xnr
such that the attack ∆xnoise is effective onM1 but transfers
poorly toM2, . . . ,Mn, while ∆xnr transfers well on all
models.
The equations for computing ∆xnr and ∆xnoise are given
in Equation 1 (see Appendix C for justification). The tech-
nique is illustrated in Figure 1.
∆xnr ≈ A(x, y, 1
n− 1
n∑
j=2
Mj ,L,0)
∆xnoise ≈ ∆x− P∆xnr (∆x)
(1)
2.3. ∆xarch and ∆xdata Decomposition
Description: We reuse notation from the above section,
except that we now consider a set of different architectures
A = {A0,A1, . . .Ak}
Proposition: ∆xnr can be composed into ∆xarch +
∆xdata such that the attack ∆xarch is effective on A0
but transfers poorly to A1, · · · ,Ak, while ∆xdata transfers
well on all models.
The equations for computing ∆xarch and ∆xdata are given
in Equation 2, in which we set ∆xnr to be the noise re-
duced perturbation generated on A0 (see Appendix C for
justification). We approximate the expectation for ∆xdata
by averaging across architectures.
∆xdata ≈
EAi∈A
A(x, y, 1
n− 1
n∑
j=2
Mij ,L,∆xnr)

∆xarch ≈ ∆xnr − P∆xdata(∆xnr)
(2)
3. Results
We empirically verify the approaches given in the motiva-
tion above and show that the isolated noise and architecture-
dependent perturbations show the desired properties. Un-
less stated otherwise, all perturbations are generated on
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Table 1. ∆xnoise decomposition (ResNet18)
∆ Morig {Mavg} {Mtest}
∆x 68.3% 45.6% 46.7%
∆xnr 63.7% 61.9% 59.5%
∆xnoise 60.2% 19.8 % 20.3%
Table 2. ∆xnoise decomposition (DenseNet121)
∆ Morig {Mavg} {Mtest}
∆x 70.0 % 47.1% 49.8%
∆xnr 64.3% 65.3% 66.6%
∆xnoise 64.9% 27.1% 29.6%
Table 2. All numbers reported are fooling ratios. Observe that ∆xnoise exhibits exceptionally low transferability.
CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky, 2009) (original images rescaled to
[−1, 1]) using iFGSM (Kurakin et al., 2016) with 10 itera-
tions, distance metric L∞, and  = 0.03. All experiments
are run on the first 2000 CIFAR-10 test images. In addition,
all models are trained for only 10 epochs due to compu-
tational constraints. All percentages reported are fooling
ratios (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017). For results with other
settings, check Appendix A.
3.1. ∆xnoise and ∆xnr Decomposition
We start off with a set of 10 retrained ResNet18 (He et al.,
2016) models {Mi}. We attack the first ResNet18 model
M1(= Morig) to get a perturbation ∆x for a given x.
We then follow the process outlined in Equation 1 to ob-
tain ∆xnr from the other 9 retrained ResNet18 models
{Mi>1}(= {Mavg}). We then test on an untouched set
of 5 retrained ResNet18 models {Mtest}. We also do the
same process for DenseNet121 (Huang et al., 2017) instead
of ResNet18 and report their respective results in Tables 1
and 2.
We note that ∆xnoise achieves a far lower transfer rate than
either ∆xnr or ∆x while still maintaining relatively high
error rate on the original model, providing evidence for the
success of this decomposition. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first methodology that is able to construct adversar-
ial examples with especially low transferability. Although
this is of low practical use, this is theoretically interest-
ing. We note that although we attempt to generate ∆xnr
by multi-fooling across 9 retrained models, reducing noise
in high dimensions is difficult, so we are unable to achieve
a perfect decomposition of ∆xnoise. Ablation studies in
Appendix B suggest that we may be able to achieve a better
decomposition with a larger set of retrained models.
3.1.1. RECOMBINING COMPONENTS
As the components ∆x̂noise and ∆x̂nr are linearly indepen-
dent unit vectors, and by definition, ∆x is in the span of
these vectors, we can find unique scalars a and b such that
a · ∆x̂noise + b · ∆x̂nr = ∆x. Experimentally, we find
that under our setting, a ≈ 1.319 and b ≈ 0.386. We note
that for our original perturbation, this is perhaps an undue
amount of focus paid to the noise-specific perturbation. We
can now try setting a and b to different ratios, which cor-
respond to how much we wish to emphasize attacking the
original model vs. transferability. As we are now able to
set an arbitrarily high a and b, allowing us to saturate the
epsilon constraints, we sign maximize (ie: sign(x) · ), as
motivated in Goodfellow et al. (2014)) to level the playing
field. The results in Table 3 show the results of performing
these experiments on ResNet18. We find that we are able
to generate perturbations that perform equivalently with
∆x onMorig, while performing substantially better when
transferring to {Mavg} andMtest.
Table 3. Linear Combinations of ∆x̂noise and ∆x̂nr
b : a Morig {Mavg} Mtest
∆xnr 65.8% 63.6% 65.1%
2:1 68.5% 63.7% 65.2%
1.5:1 69.4% 61.2% 62.8%
1:1 69.8% 56.0% 56.4%
1:2 70.0% 53.1% 53.5%
∆x 69.8% 51.0% 51.0%
Table 3. All numbers reported are fooling ratios. Observe that as
you increase the ratio b : a we obtain better transferability with
lowered effectiveness onMorig . Also note that we are able to
construct perturbations that are strictly superior to either ∆x or
∆xnr .
3.2. ∆xarch and ∆xdata Decomposition
To evaluate decomposition into architecture and data-
specific components, we consider the four architectures
ResNet18 (He et al., 2016), GoogLeNet (Szegedy et al.,
2015), DenseNet121 (Huang et al., 2017), and SENet18
(Hu et al., 2017). Results are given in Table 4. In each
experiment we first fix a source architecture Ai and gener-
ate ∆xnr by attacking 4 retrained copies of Ai, denoted as
{Msource}. We then generate ∆xdata by attacking four
copies of each Aj 6=i for twelve models total. We then
test on another 4 retrained copies of Ai called {M′source}
as well as {M′other}, consisting of four copies of each
of the other three architectures {Aj 6=i}. We see that for
all four models, ∆xarch obtains significantly higher er-
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Table 4. ∆xarch decomposition
source ∆ {Msource} {Mother} {M′source} {M′other}
∆xnr 60.9% 50.7% 59.4% 50.7%
ResNet18 ∆xdata 54.6% 61.4% 54.8% 60.8%
∆xarch 52.4% 26.7% 36.9% 30.3%
∆xnr 62.8% 46.2% 62.9% 47.1%
DenseNet121 ∆xdata 58.4% 58.3% 57.2% 55.7%
∆xarch 54.1% 24.4% 43.1% 26.0%
∆xnr 65.3% 41.9% 65.7% 41.9%
GoogLeNet ∆xdata 59.5% 59.2% 59.5% 58.3%
∆xarch 57.9% 22.8% 44.8% 26.2%
∆xnr 53.8% 48.4% 53.2% 49.0%
SENet18 ∆xdata 55.7% 64.5% 54.8% 63.8%
∆xarch 47.1% 28.1% 38.6% 29.8%
Table 4. All numbers reported are fooling ratios. Note that for all architectures, the adversarial decomposition holds. Namely, ∆xarch is
more transferable to its specific architecture than to others, whereas ∆xdata is equally transferable across architectures.
ror rate on {M′source} than on {M′other}. In addition,
the relative error between {M′source} and {M′other} for
∆xarch are close to the relative error between {Msource}
and {Mother} for ∆xnr when averaged across models, sup-
porting the success of our decomposition.
3.3. Ablation
Orthogonality We assume that ∆xnoise, ∆xarch, and
∆xdata terms are orthogonal. We note that if these vectors
had no relation to each other, then due to the properties of
high dimensional space, they are approximately orthogonal
with very high probability.
We vary orthogonality by modifying the method in Section
2.2 to generate ∆xnoise with ∆x − αP∆xnr (∆x). When
α = 1, we recover the original algorithm, and when α = 0,
∆xnoise = ∆x. Experimentally varying the orthogonality
of ∆xnoise and ∆xnr produces the results in Table 5; note
that we achieve the greatest difference in efficacy between
the original model and transferred models when they are
near-orthogonal, suggesting that the assumption we made is
reasonable.
However, it is not true that orthogonal components achieve
the best isolation (given by the fact that the peak difference
seems to be at α = 1.2). This suggests that our current
method of decomposition may simply be an approximation
for the true components, and that a more nuanced method
may be necessary for better isolation.
Number of Models We find that the higher the number of
models we use to approximate ∆xnr, the more successfully
we are able to isolate ∆xnoise. Check Appendix B for full
results.
Table 5. Varying α
α Morig {Mavg} Difference
∆x 68.3% 45.6% 22.7
∆xnr 63.7% 61.9% 1.8
0.1 66.7% 42.2% 24.5
0.5 63.4% 29.1% 34.3
0.8 59.7% 21.4% 38.3
1.0 52.7% 16.6% 36.1
1.2 51.9% 11.3% 40.6
1.5 42.9% 9.4% 33.5
2.0 33.5% 7.2% 26.3
Table 5. All percentages reported are fooling ratios. Note that the
α = 1.2 setting is what produces maximal difference, which is
slightly different from the assumed orthogonality (α = 1.0).
4. Conclusion
We demonstrate that it is possible to decompose adversar-
ial perturbations into noise-dependent and data-dependent
components, a hypothesis reviewers thought was interesting
but unsupported in (Wu et al., 2018). We go even further
by decomposing an adversarial perturbation into model re-
lated, data related, and noise related perturbations. A major
contribution here is a new method of analyzing adversar-
ial examples; this creates many potential future directions
for research. One interesting direction would be extending
these decompositions to universal perturbations (Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2017; Poursaeed et al., 2017) and thus re-
moving the dependence on individual data points. Another
avenue to explore is analyzing various attacks and defenses
and how they interplay with these various components.
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Appendix
A. Different attack settings
To show that our decomposition is effective across a variety
of attack settings, we perform the experiment of Section
3.1 with three different iFGSM settings corresponding to
 = 0.01, 0.03, 0.06. Results are shown in Table 6.
Table 6. Varying 
 ∆ {Morig} {Mavg} {Mtest}
∆x 39.0% 16.4% 14.4%
.01 ∆xnr 25.1% 28.4% 22.2%
∆xnoise 26.6% 06.2% 05.3%
∆x 68.3% 45.6% 46.7%
.03 ∆xnr 63.7% 61.9% 59.5%
∆xnoise 60.2% 19.8% 20.3%
∆x 81.2% 69.7% 73.6%
.06 ∆xnr 81.1% 80.5% 85.8%
∆xnoise 77.7% 39.4% 40.0%
B. Varying number of models/iterations
We investigate the effectiveness of the Section 3.1 decompo-
sition as we vary hyper-parameters. Results for increasing
iFGSM iterations in Table 7 and results for increasing the
results for increasing the number of models are give in Table
8.
Table 7. Varying number of iterations used for iFGSM
# of iters ∆ {Morig} {Mavg}
∆x 65.2% 43.4%
5 ∆xnr 58.8% 58.8%
∆xnoise 55.5% 20.6%
∆x 68.3% 46.7%
10 ∆xnr 63.7% 61.9%
∆xnoise 60.2% 19.8%
∆x 72.9% 48.6%
100 ∆xnr 67.3% 65.2%
∆xnoise 60.3% 18.7%
C. Justification of Equations
Justification of Equations in 3.1
Recall that the equations are given by
Table 8. Varying number of models used to approximate ∆xnr
# of models ∆ {Morig} {Mavg} {Mtest}
∆x 69.4% 46.6% 45.6%
3 ∆xnr 57.6% 62.1% 51.9%
∆xnoise 60.1% 24.9% 29.2%
∆x 68.4% 47.0% 44.8%
5 ∆xnr 60.1% 62.0% 55.2%
∆xnoise 57.5% 22.4% 24.6%
∆x 68.3% 45.6% 46.7%
10 ∆xnr 63.7% 61.9% 59.5%
∆xnoise 60.2% 19.8% 20.3%
∆xnr ≈ A(x, y, 1
n− 1
n∑
j=2
Mj ,L, 0)
∆xnoise ≈ ∆x− P∆xnr (∆x)
We assume that the expected value of our noise term
∆xnoise is 0 over all random noise. This is motivated be-
cause the random noise i at initialization is a Gaussian
distribution centered at 0, and it is reasonable to assume that
the model distribution and the noise distribution follows a
similar pattern.
Letting ∆xj = A(x, y,Mj ,L, 0) over all random initializa-
tion i, we claim that Ej [∆xj ] = ∆xarch + ∆xdata. Since
∆xarch and ∆xdata are noise independent, which means
that
∆xj = ∆xjnoise + ∆xarch + ∆xdata
where ∆xjnoise is the noise component corresponding with
the noise of modelMj . Therefore, it follows that
Ej [∆xj ] = ∆xarch + ∆xdata + Ej [∆xjnoise]
= ∆xarch + ∆xdata = ∆xnr
By the law of large numbers, it follows that
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
j=1
∆xj = ∆xnr. Therefore, we note that,
for sufficiently large n, it follows that
1
n
n∑
j=1
∆xj ≈ ∆xnr
We see that, since the cross entropy loss L is additive and
the attack A that we examine are first order differentiation
methods, we have
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L( 1
n− 1
n∑
j=2
Mj(x), y) = 1
n− 1
n∑
j=2
L(Mj(x), y)
=⇒ A(x, y, 1
n− 1
n∑
j=2
Mj ,L, 0)
=
1
n− 1
n∑
j=2
A(x, y,Mj ,L, 0) ≈ ∆xnr
To prove the other claim, we have already shown through
empirical results and an intuition that ∆xnoise and ∆xnr
are linearly independent that ∆xnoise and ∆xnr are very
close to orthogonal and compose ∆x. Therefore, it follows
that we can take the use the projection of ∆xnr implies that
∆xnoise + P∆xnr (∆x) ≈ ∆x
=⇒ ∆xnoise ≈ ∆x− P∆xnr (∆x)
up to a scaling constant.
Justification of Equations in 3.2
Recall that the equations are, given ∆nr generated on A0,
∆xdata ≈ EAi∈A
A(x, y, 1
n− 1
n∑
j=2
Mij ,L,∆xnr)

∆xarch ≈ ∆xnr − P∆xdata(∆xnr)
We make two core assumptions:
• The value of ∆EA[xarch] = 0. This is a reasonable
assumption since our generated architectures A should
produce roughly symmetric error vectors xarch.
• A(x, y, 1n−1
∑n
j=2M,L,∆x′) is equivalent
A(x, y,M,L, 0) in the sense that the former
produces a noised reduce gradient closer to ∆x′. This
is reasonable because the space of there are many
adversarial perturbations (different directions) and
changing our start location won’t cripple our search
space. Furthermore, we use this to generate a ∆nr
close to ∆x′.
We claim that EA[∆xnr] = ∆xdata where we take ∆xnr
over architecture A. To see this, we note that
EA[∆xnr] = EA[∆xarch] + EA[∆xdata] = EA[∆xdata]
and so again we can approximate it with
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
∆xinr = ∆xdata where ∆x
i
nr is the ∆xnr
component generated for model Ai. For sufficiently large
n, it follows that
1
n
n∑
i=1
∆xinr = ∆xdata
Therefore we have
∆xdata = EAi∈A[∆xinr] = EAi∈AEj [(x, y,Mij ,L, 0)]
≈ EAi∈A
A(x, y, 1
n− 1
n∑
j=2
Mij ,L, 0)

and by our assumption this is roughly equivalent to
EAi∈A
A(x, y, 1
n− 1
n∑
j=2
Mij ,L,∆xnr)

as desired. To prove the other claim, we use an analogous
argument to the one above as we have shown that ∆xarch
and ∆xdata are orthogonal and applying the same projection
technique yields
∆xdata + P∆xdata(∆xnr) ≈ ∆xnr
=⇒ ∆xarch ≈ ∆x− P∆xdata(∆xnr)
up to a scaling constant.
